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The Evolution of Human Cooperation: Ritual and Social Complexity in Stateless Societies. CHARLES
STANISH, 2017. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. xiii + 336 pp.$110.00 (hardback), ISBN: 978-1107-18055-0.
In this significant book, Stanish builds a model of how complex stateless societies solve collective action
problems to benefit their members in the absence of coercive leadership; not in the absence of
leadership, but in the absence of coercive leadership. The model is framed by Game Theory, which he
recasts as Anthropological Game Theory, and Collective Action Theory, making the claim that humans
are conditional cooperators. Crucial to successful and sustainable cooperation is a “ritualized economy”:
an economy with “rules of co-operative economic behavior…[encoded]…in a variety of ritual practices.
This economy, structured by ritual, enculturated by habit, and culturally transmitted across generations,
is the means by which the emergent properties of co-operation inherent in social interaction lead to
‘strong’ forms of co-operation (p. 7)”.
He accomplishes this in eight chapters, the first introducing the argument, and key notions such as
complex stateless societies and the ritualized economy. He distinguishes among simple stateless
societies – hunter-gatherer bands – complex stateless societies, and states. Complex stateless societies
are significantly larger than bands, contain both kin and non-kin who cooperate over long time periods,
often on projects such as the construction of “special places” or monuments, but in the absence of
coercive leadership. He also introduces Game Theory and the Behavioral Economics’ concepts central to
his argument.
Chapter Six succinctly summarizes the model, which is comprised of nine claims: In the shift from
egalitarian to complex stateless societies, people are not forced to adopt hierarchies; increased
population density is a necessary precondition that permits people to create complex forms of
cooperation; individuals benefit from participating in cooperative groups; the cooperative group creates
leadership positions lacking coercive power to meet group interests; group membership is fluid;
successful groups solve free rider problems and allocate payoffs for group participation by developing
appropriate norms and behaviors; “they assure success…[by]… ritualizing production and exchange (p.
167)”; the strategies that produce group success persist and spread either through imitation by other
groups, or the group’s absorption; successful groups reinforce and advertise their success by creating
“special places” (e.g.. monuments) on the landscape; and “Group formation is cyclical. There is no
inevitability in this process (p. 168).”
The intervening chapters (Two through Five) develop the theoretical and empirical bases for these
claims. In Chapter Two Stanish critiques classical economics, economic anthropology, and the concept of
the rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing actor of classical economics, showing how this
conception was set against the apparently irrational actors in “primitive” – i.e. non-western, non-state -economies. They are rational, but the premises of their rationality are different. Chapter Three uses
game theory to develop the argument that humans are conditional cooperators. The fourth chapter
examines the history and theoretical role of coercion in social theories, using Hayden’s aggrandizer
theory as an influential modern example of coercion-based theories. Chapter Five is a lengthy
explanation of the “ritualized economy”, which is a form of economy not accommodated by standard
economic theories. One of his conundrums is what to call it, “ritualized” is unsatisfactory, given its
religious connotations in English, but the word best captures his sense. He again defends this choice in
the last chapter, the Epilogue, where he revisits the concept of a ritualized economy. Chapter Seven is

the archaeological test; he applies the model to archaeological data, first to the relationship between
population growth and non-state complex societies, and second, making predictions about the earliest
“special places”. He tests the model against four case studies: Andean South America (where he
conducts research), the Neolithic Near East, the Archaic in Eastern North America, and Neolithic
Northwestern Europe.
The model is based on the voluminous ethnographic literature on non-state complex societies, but
particularly of Melanesia; His thinking is heavily influenced by Bronislaw Malinowski. Stanish importantly
revives the debate about the initial causes of permanent leadership: was it managerial or coercive? His
answer is managerial, but unlike earlier theories, it arises bottom up at the behest of group members,
not bottom down from the action of proto-elites. He promises in his next book to tackle how we went
from that to top-down coercive power. The ritualized economy concept should force a productive reevaluation of the political economies of non-state societies.
The book is intellectually stimulating, dense, but accessible and well written. The scholarship is
impressive. It is not without flaws. His arguments rely too heavily on simple oppositions; I think, for
example, there is a lot more gray between non-coercive and coercive leadership than his critique of
Hayden allows. But hopefully it will spark useful debate and research.

